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THE PROPRIETY OF DENYING ENTRY TO 
HOMOSEXUAL ALIENS: EXAMINING THE 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE'S AUTHORITY 
OVER MEDICAL EXCLUSIONS 
From the early 1950's through the late 1970's, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) routinely denied homosexual aliens I ad-
mission to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(4) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA). 2 This provision requires the ex-
clusion of aliens afflicted with "psychopathic personality" or, after 
the 1965 Amendment,3 "sexual deviation." Both the INS and the Public 
Health Service (PHS) participate in the exclusion process. 4 The INS 
administers the general inspection procedure, 5 and the PHS performs 
medical examinations. 6 
In the last decade, however, health professionals have questioned 
the status of homosexuality as a mental illness, and this change has 
affected immigration policy. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion (APA) removed homosexuality from its list of mental diseases. 7 
In 1979, the PHS responded to the reappraisal of homosexuality by 
1. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 
U.S.C. § 110l(a)(3) (1982). . 
2. 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(4) (1982). 
3. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (amending the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act § 212(a)(4)) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982)). 
4. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1224, 1225(a) (1982). 
5. "The inspection, other than physical and mental examination, of aliens ... seeking ad-
mission ... shall be conducted by immigration officers .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (1982). 
6. "The physical and mental examination of arriving aliens ... shall be made by medical 
officers of the United States Public Health Service .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982). 
7. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 1. In the first six printings of the AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 
1968) [hereinafter cited as DSM-II], homosexuality, fetishism, pedophilia, transvestism, exhibi-
tionism, voyeurism, sadism, masochism, and other sexual deviations were included under the 
heading "Sexual Deviations." Socarides, The Sexual Deviations and the Diagnostic Manual, 32 
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 414, 418 (1978). Sexual deviations appear under the general headings of 
"Personality Disorders" and "Certain Other Non-Psychotic Mental Disorders." Id. The seventh 
printing of DSM-II (July 1974) substituted "sexual orientation disturbance (homosexuality)" 
for homosexuality. Id. at 421. This new classification comprises persons troubled by their sexual . 
interests in persons of the same sex, as distinguished from homosexuality per se, a form of sex-· 
ual behavior not itself a psychiatric disorder. Id. See generally Ferlemann, Homosexuality, 5 
MENNINGER PERSPECTIVE, Summer 1974, at 24; Hadden, Homosexuality: Its Questioned Classifica-
tion, 6 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 165 (1976); Should Homosexuality Be in the APA Nomenclature?, 
130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1207 (1973); Note, The Immigration and Nationality Act and the Exclu-
sion of Homosexuals: Boutilier v. INS Revisited, 2 CARoozo L. REv. 359, 366-69 (1981). 
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refusing to furnish the INS with the medical certification that, until 
that time, had provided the basis for the exclusion of homosexual aliens. 8 
In response to the PHS position, the INS, relying on its interpretation 
of the INA, established a procedure by which it would exclude homosex-
ual aliens even absent medical certification. 9 • 
Courts differ on the validity of the INS practice of excluding aliens 
without medical certification. In the context of a deportation proceeding, 
the Ninth Circuit held, in Hill v. INS, 10 that medical certificatioa by 
the PHS is an indispensable requirement for · excluding an alien on 
medical grounds. 11 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding in In re 
Longstaff, 12 a naturalization case, that the INS has the authority to 
exclude homosexual aliens despite the absence of a medical certificate. 13 
This Note defends the position that the PHS has the authority to 
define homosexuality for the purpose of the section 212(a)(4) exclu-
sion, and that the PHS definition is binding upon the INS. Therefore, 
the PHS's decision to refuse to examine aliens for homosexuality 
precludes the INS from excluding aliens on that basis. Part I of this 
Note traces the history of the policy of excluding homosexual aliens. 
Part II maintains that, regardless of the psychiatric profession's inter-
pretation of ''psychopathic personality,'' Congress intended the expres-
sion to encompass homosexuality. Part III contends that Congress in-
tended to empower the PHS to change its policy concerning the exclu-
sion of homosexual aliens. Part IV examines the effect of judicial 
responses to the PHS's change in policy on the exclusion, deportation, 
and naturalization of homosexual aliens, as well as the prospect of 
congressional resolution of this controversy. 
I. HISTORY OF THE EXCLUSION OF HOMOSEXUAL ALIENS 
Since the late nineteenth century, Congress has enacted a number 
of statutes containing provisions that have excluded aliens afflicted with 
mental disabilities from admission into the United States. 14 Congress 
8. See Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for 
Health, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to William Foege and 
George Lythcott (Aug. 2, 1979), reprinted in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 398-99 (1979) (hereinafter 
cited as Memorandum of the Surgeon General]; see also id. at 387-88. 
9. See Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, to David L. 
Crosland, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Dec. 10, 1979), reprinted 
in 56 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs 572-81 (1979) [ht;reinafter cited as Memorandum of Attorney General]; 
Department of Justice Press Release (Sept. 9, 1980), reprinted in 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 441-42 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Press Release]; see also 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 440-41 (1980); 56 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 569-71 (1979). 
10. 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). 
11. Id. at 1480. 
12. 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3861 (May 29, 1984). 
13. Id. at 1448. 
14. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214; Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, 
§ I, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084; Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898-99; Im-
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initially sought to stem the influx of aliens likely to become dependents 
of the. states, 1 ' and consequently limited the purview of its first Act 
to "lunatics" and "idiots." 16 Subsequent statutes,1 7 however, excluded 
aliens on the basis of mental disability, without relating the disability 
to the alien's capability of self-support. 18 In order to achieve this broader 
objective, Congress expanded its formulation of mental disabilities by 
including within it "persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority." 19 
Although no court ever determined that the expression ''constitutional 
psychopathic inferiority" encompassed homosexuality, 20 this exp res-
migration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917); Immigration and Nationality 
(McCarran-Walter) Act § 212(a)(l)-(5), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 
§ l5(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(l)-(5) (1982)). 
15. The Act of Aug. 3, 1882 specifically refers to lunatics and idiots who are "unable to 
take care .of [themselves) without becoming ... public charge[s)," ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 
and before Congress passed the Act of Mar. 3, 1891, "[t)he Ford committee reported that there 
were thousands of alien paupers, insane persons, and idiots landing in this country annually 
who became a burden upon the States .... " S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1950). 
16. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214. 
17. Immigration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 1917); Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 212(a)(l)-(5), amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. t. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 
79 Stat. 911, 919 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(5) (1982)). 
18. The 1917 Act added "persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority" and "persons 
with chronic alcoholism" to the list of mental disabilities set forth in earlier statutes. The Senate 
report accompanying that bill expiained that the purpose of these additions and other changes 
was to "prevent the introduction into the country of strains of mental defect that may continue 
and multiply through succeeding generations, irrespective of the immediate effect .thereof on 
earning capacity." S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1917), quoted in S. REP. No. 
1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 338 (1950). 
19. Immigration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917). 
20. A Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, In re La.Rochelle, 11 I. & N. Dec. 
436 (BIA 1965), however, held that a homosexual came within the meaning of the term "con-
stitutional psychopathic inferiority," but, in light of the alien's good standing, the BIA held 
the deportation order in abeyance pending naturalization proceedings. The BIA based its inclu-
sion of homosexual persons under the heading "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" on the 
PHS regulations interpreting the expression. Although these regulations were not, in and of 
themselves, conclusive, the BIA also maintained that replacement of the term "constitutional 
psychopathic inferiority" with "psychopathic personality" in the 1952 Act represented Congress's 
desire to continue excluding homosexual aliens. Looking to the legislative history of the 195~ 
Act, which explicitly expressed an intent to exclude homosexuals, see infra note 38 and accompa-
nying text, the Board reasoned that since the later term did not to add to or modify the earlier 
term, the two must be coextensive. Id. at 440-41. Still, prior to the. 1952 Act, the BIA only ex-
cluded aliens if they admitted to, or were convicted of, the commission of a homosexual act 
that constituted a crime involving moral turpitude. Immigration Act, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 3, 
39 Stat. 874, 875 (1917); see In re W-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 578 (BIA 1953) (deponation for admission 
to crime of gross indecency, i.e., "male practicing masturbation with another male"); cf. In 
re S-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 576 (BIA 1953) (insufficient information in the record to conclude that 
conviction of the crime of gross indecency between males under a Michigan statute constituted 
a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude); In re Z-_, 2 I. & N. Dec. 316 (BIA 1945) 
(lack of a definition for the term "gross indecency," as used in the Canadian Criminal Code, 
precluded the BIA from concluding that the crime of "gross indecency with another male per-
son" constituted a crime involving moral turpitude). The BIA's use of the "crime of moral 
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sion acted as the precursor of the terms "psychopathic personality" 21 
and "sexual deviation, " 22 which immigration officials and courts have 
employed to exclude homosexual aliens from admission. 23 
A. Legislative History of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
In 1947, the Senate undertook a comprehensive investigation of the 
immigration system. 24 This investigation culminated in the release of 
a Judiciary Committee Report,2s which recommended the addition of 
"homosexuals and other sex perverts" to the class of medically ex-
cludable aliens. 26 A bill incorporating these recommendations accom-
panied the report. 27 
To aid its deliberation, Congress asked the Public Health Service 
(PHS) to comment on the medical aspects of the proposed legislation. 28 
The PHS responded, 29 but the meaning and implications of its response 
remain unclear. Unlike.its analyses of the other medical classifications 
set forth by the bill, 30 the PHS's comments on "homosexuals and sex 
perverts" included no specific recommendation. Instead, the PHS ad-
dressed the difficulty encountered in substantiating the diagnosis of 
homosexuality and sexual perversion, 31 and added that, in "instances 
turpitude" clause rather than the "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" clause as a means 
of denying admission to aliens who had apparently engaged in homosexual activity may indicate 
that prior to the 1952 Act, homosexuality was not deemed a "constitutional psychopathic in-
feriority." See United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 412-413 (2d Cir. 1956) (concur-
ring opinion stating that the phrase "constitutional psychopathic inferiority" of the 1917 Act 
did not clearly include homosexuals, but that the legislative history of the expression "psychopathic 
personality" plainly indicates that homosexual persons were encompassed within that term). 
21. . Immigration and Naturalization Act § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(4) (1982). 
22. Id., as amended by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 9ll, 919. 
23. See Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 387 U.S. ll8 (1967); Quiroz 
v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961). 
24. S. Res. 137, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REc. 7879, 10,352 (1947). 
25. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). 
26. Id. at 345 (the subcommittee recommended that "constitutional psychopathic inferior-
ity" be replaced by "psychopathic personality" and the classes of mentally defectives enlarged 
to include "homosexuals and other sex perverts"). 
27. S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (introduced by Sen. McCarran). 
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CoNG. & 
AD. NEws 1653, 1699 [hereinafter cited as PHS REPORT). 
29. Id. at 1699-1702. 
30. The PHS recommended that Congress: (l) eliminate the term "feeble-minded" from the 
expression "idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded ... , " (2) drop "loathsome disease" from the pro-
vision which includes "dangerous contagious disease," (3) regroup the categories so that "nar-
cotic drug addicts" will appear among the other classes subject ·10 medical determination, and 
so that "aliens who are paupers, professional beggars, or vagrants" would not, and (4) retain the 
expressions "epileptics," "psychopathic personality," "mental defects," and "tuberculosis." Id. 
31. Id. at 1701 (PHS noting that although some psychological tests may help uncover homosex-
uality of which the individual himself is unaware, there are no reliable laboratory tests for diagnosing 
homosexuality, and an individual may therefore successfully conceal a history of homosexuality). 
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where the disturbance in sexuality [might] be difficult to uncover, a 
more obvious disturbance in personality [might] be encountered which 
would warrant a classification of psychopathic personality or mental 
defect. " 32 
The Senate Judiciary Committee reformulated the immigration bill33 
to reflect both the PHS report and testimony presented in joint 
hearings. 34 This new bill35 eliminated "homosexuals and sex perverts" 
as an exclusionary category. The report36 accompanying the bill main-
tained that the Senate made this change in response to the PHS asser-
tion that ''the provision for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with 
psychopathic personality or a mental defect ... [was] sufficiently broad 
to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts." 37 The 
report further specified that the "change in nomenclature [was] not 
to be construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens 
who are sexual deviates. " 38 The revised bill passed Congress to become 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 39 
B. Judicial Interpretation of the INA 
The first significant issue•0 to arise from the application of section 
212(a)(4)41 of the INA concerned whether the expression "psychopathic 
personality" included "homosexuality." Initially there was little doubt 
that it did. Following a number of administrative decisions,•2 the Sec-
32. Id. 
33. The original bill, S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), had been introduced by Sen. McCar-
ran. This bill was reintroduced in the next session without significant modification. S. 716, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). Rep. Walter submitted a similar bill to the House, H.R. 2379, 82d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1951), while Rep. Cellar introduced a competing bill which, among other differences, 
did not include "persons afflicted with psychopathic personality," "homosexuals," or "sex 
perverts" as classes of excludable aliens. H.R. 2816, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). 
34. Revision of Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality Laws: Joint Hearings on S. 
716, H.R. 2379, and H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 784 (1951). 
35. S. 2550, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). 
36. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). 
37. Id. at 9. 
38. Id. 
39. H.R. 5678, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), which was introduced by Rep. Walter, passed Con-
gress on June 27, 1952 to become the Immigration and Naturalization (McCarran-Walter) Act, 
ch. 2, 66 Stat. 166 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (1976)). The final wording of the 
relevant subsection, § 212(a)(4) of the INA, provided for the exclusion of "(a]liens afflicted 
with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect." 
40. The second important issue, which concerns what institution should have the authority 
to define homosexuality, provides the focus for Part III of this Note. The issue becomes signifi-
cant only when it has been established that homosexuality is included within "psychopathic per-
sonality." This task is undertaken in Part II of the Note. 
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982). 
42. In re P-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 258 (BIA 1956); In re S-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1959). 
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ond Circuit in Quiroz v. Neel/y43 looked to the legislative history of 
the Act and concluded that, regardless of the medical profession's 
understanding of the term "psychQpathic personality," Congress in-
tended it to include homosexuality. 44 
In Fleuti v. Rosenberg,4' however, the Ninth Circuit disrupted this 
consensus. 46 F/euti involved the deportation47 of an allegedly homosexual 
alien under section 241(a)(l) of the INA, 48 a provision requiring the 
deportation of any alien who, though excludable at the time of entry, 
had somehow gained admission. The Ninth Circuit objected to the use 
of postentry behavior in determining the excludability of an alien, 49 
and maintained that evidence of homosexual activity subsequent to entry 
was irrelevant to the decision of whether immigration officials should 
have admitted an alien in the first place. Unfortunately, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's determination that, in the context of postentry behavior, the ex-
pression "psychopathic personality" was void for vagueness'0 led some 
43. 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961). 
44. We find it unnecessary "to embark" ... "on an amateur's voyage on the fog-
enshrouded sea of psychiatry." . . . The legislative history is clear as to the meaning 
to be given to ["psychopathic personality"] .... Whatever the phrase ... may mean 
to the psychiatrist, to Congress it was.intended to include homosexuals and sex perverts. 
It is that intent which controls here. 
Id. at 907. 
4S. 302 F.2d 6S2 (9th Cir. 1962), vacafeaand remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S.449 (1963). 
46. In addition to the authorities mentioned in notes 42 and 43, supra, other courts have 
interpreted§ 212(a)(4) without directly applying it to exclude or deport a hoinosexual alien. See, 
e.g., United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 412-13 (2d Cir. 19S6) (Frank, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the legislative history of the expression "psychopathic personality" plainly 
indicates that homosexual persons were encompassed within that term); Ganduxe y Marino v. 
Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (where alien convicted of solicitation of another 
male denied ever having been arrested or convicted, the court deemed the misrepresentation material 
since, had this information been known earlier, "an attempt would almost certainly have been 
made to exclude him" as a homosexual person under § 212(a)(4) of the INA), aff'd sub nom. 
Ganduxe y Marino v. Esperdy, 278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960). 
47. Although § 212(a)(4) of the INA explicitly pertains to. the excludability of aliens, most 
cases under that section involve deportation proceedings. The reason for this lies in the differing 
due process requirements for exclusion and deportation. These requirements facilitate more readily 
appeals on substantive matters for deportations. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 18S, 
187 (19S8); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (19S3). See generally 
Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARv. L. REv. 
1286, 1311-33 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Developments); Note, Constitutional Limits on the 
Power to Exclude Aliens, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 9S7 (1982); Note, Limitations on Congressional 
Power to Deport Resident Aliens Excludable as Psychopaths at Time of Entry, 68 YALE L.J. 
931 (19S9). 
An excluded alien who has exhausted his administrative remedies may obtain judicial review 
of an exclusion order only by habeas corpus proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § llOS(b) (1982). See Les-
bian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. S69, 57S (N.D. Cal. 1982), modified 
sub nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). 
48. 8 U.S.C. § 12Sl(a)(l) (1982). 
49. 302 F.2d at 6S5. 
50. 302 F.2d at 654-S8. 
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courts to misunderstand the case, and at least one court interpreted 
Fleuti to mean that homosexual aliens could not be excluded as "per-
sons afflicted with psychopathic personality.'' 51 
In Boutilier v. INS, 52 the Supreme Court eliminated the confusion 
surrounding the validity of using the expression ''psychopathic per-
sonality" to exclude homosexual aliens. The Court held that Congress 
intended the expression ''psychopathic personality'' to include 
homosexuality53 and, furthermore, that the phrase is not used as a 
clinical term, but as an expression designed to achieve Congress's goal 
of excluding homosexual aliens. 54 The Court also rejected the void-
for-vagueness argument, asserting that, with regard to preentry55 
51. Lavoie v. INS, 360 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam), vacated and remanded per curiam, 
387 U.S. 572 (1967), on remand, 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1970). The Lavoie court included none 
of the judges who handed down the 1962 Fleuti decision. The court issued a per curiam decision 
which, without revealing any of the cases's facts, maintained that Fleuti stood for the proposi-
tion that the term "psychopathic personality" is void for vagueness as applied to homosexuals. 
The actual facts of Lavoie reveal that, unlike in Fleuti, the court based its decision to deport 
Lavoie exclusively on evidence of preentry behavior. In re Lavoie, 121. & N. DEC. 821 (BIA 1968). 
Congress also seems to have read Fleuti too broadly. Its 1965 amendment of 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(4) 
was a response to its determination that Fleuti had held section 212(a)(4) to be "unconstitu-
tionally vague in that homosexuality was not sufficiently encompassed within the term 'psychopathic 
personality.'" S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st_ Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CooE CoNG. & 
Ao. NEWS 3328, 3337. 
52. 387 U.S. 118 (1967). Justice Brennan dissented for the same reasons Judge Moore did 
in the lower court opinion. Justices Douglas and Fortas dissented because they found "psychopathic 
personality" too vague a term to be employed as a criterion for imposition of penalities or punish-
ment and that "affliction" conveyed the idea of an accustomed pattern of conduct, or a way 
of life, which had not been demonstrated in this case. Id. at 125-35. 
53. The court relied on legislative history, especially S. REP. No. 1137, see supra text accom-
panying note 38, in finding that "the Act indicates beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Con-
gress intended the phrase 'psychopathic personality' to include homosexuals .... " 387 U.S. at 120. 
· Justice Brennan dissented for the same reasons that Judge Moore dissented from the lower 
court opinion. Judge Moore's interpretation of congressional intent, which is probably closer 
to the sentiments expressed in the PHS comments on the proposed bill, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 80-85, contends that Congress could not have intended to exclude all homosexual 
persons, but only those who have a "long-lasting and perhaps compulsive orientation towards 
homosexual or otherwise 'abnormal' behavior.'' 363 F.2d at 488. This distinction goes to the 
parameters of Congress's definition of homosexuality, rather than to the more general question 
of whether "psychopathic personality" represents a medical term or a term of art. Judge Moore 
does not deny that Congress intended to exclude certain homosexual aliens under § 212(a)(4) 
of the INA, but only insofar as these homosexual aliens are afflicted with psychopathic per-
sonality, id. at 498; he contests the validity of the PHS decision that this particular homosexual 
alien suffered from "psychopathic personality.'' 
54. Because of the manner in which Congress expressed its reasons for adopting the expres-
sion "psychopathic personality," the Court concluded that the term was not used in its medical 
sense. 387 U.S. at 121-22. The Court based this conclusion on Congress's arguably erroneous 
assertion that it was adopting a PHS recommendation. See infra text accompanying notes 80-89. 
The lower court refers to the expression "psychopathic personality" as a term of art, 363 F.2d 
at 493-94, and relies on the same reasoning as Quiroz, see supra note 44. 
55. Boutilier, unlike Fleuti, involved a deportation based on evidence of exclusively preentry 
behavior. 387 U.S. at 123-24. 
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behavior, Congress's plenary power to make rules for the admission 
of aliens was not subject to any constitutional requirement of fair 
warning. 56 
C. 1965 Amendment 
In 1965, Congress substantially revised immigration policy. 57 One 
change made was the addition of the term "sexual deviation" to sec-
tion 212(a)(4) of the INA in response to its understanding of the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Fleuti. 58 The report accompanying this legislation 
first reiterated the Judiciary Committee's 1952 position that the "change 
in nomenclature'' resulting from the elimination of homosexuality and 
sexual perversion as explicit exclusionary categories was "not to be 
construed in any way as modifying the intent to exclude all aliens who 
are sexual deviates. " 59 The report then explained that the committee 
specifically had added the medical60 term "sexual deviation" as a ground 
of exclusion to resolve any remaining doubt. 61 
56. Id. at 123. 
Justices Douglas and Fortas dissented on the ground that the term "psychopathic personality" 
was too vague to be used as a standard for the imposition of deportation. Id. at 125-35. 
Judge Moore's dissent, on which Justice Brennan based his dissent, argued that had the exclu-
sionary expression been less vague, the alien could have modified his preentry behavior. Conse-
quently, he agreed with the decision in Lavoie, see supra note 51, 363 F.2d at 498-99. 
57. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (amending the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)). 
58. See supra note 51. 
59. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951), quoted in S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3328, 3337. "In view of the represen-
tations made by the U.S. Public Health Service that the term 'psychopathic personality' would 
encompass homosexuals and sex perverts, the Congress in enacting the [INA] omitted from the 
law any specific provision relating to the ineligibility of such persons." S. REP. No. 748, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328, 3337. 
60. A number of congressional representatives indicated in debate on the floor of the House 
that "sexual deviation" represents a medical term. Rep. Feighan, Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Immigration and Nationality of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in reporting the 
bill stated that it "establishes a new class of aliens who are mandatorily excluded from admis-
sion. Those are persons classified under the medical term of 'sexual deviation.'" 111 CONG. 
REc. 21,586 (1965). Rep. Gilbert commented that "[t]he measure ... retains the exclusionary 
provisions of its predecessors, designed to assure that the United States does not become burdened 
with persons who are physically or morally unfit. Though this objective remains unchanged, 
several of the old definitions of unfitness have been refined to conform with"•new medical or 
psychological knowledge.'' Ill CONG. REc. 21,771 (1965). Rep. Poff stated that, by using the 
precise term "sexual deviation," "the bill makes it plain that the Congress intends that aliens 
afflicted with that disgraceful disability be excluded from our shores.'' Ill CoNG. REc. 21,782 
(1965). Finally, Rep. Ryan noted that "certain mental and physical conditions warranting ex-
cludability under the old law have been clarified and made to conform with recent advances 
in medical science.'' Ill CoNG. REc. 21,782 (1965). 
61. S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 3328, 3337. The amended version of§ 212(a)(4) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982), 
provides for the exclusion of "[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality, sexual deviation, 
or a mental defect." 
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The examination of two issues may prove helpful in analyzing the 
dispute that has arisen from the refusal of the PHS to certify aliens 
who are homosexual as medically excludable. The first issue involves 
whether homosexuality constitutes a form of "psychopathic personal-
ity." This was the primary concern of pre-Boutilier decisions and is 
roughly equivalent to asking whether Boutilier was correctly decided. 
The second issue assumes, for reasons which will be developed in this 
section, that ·Boutilier was correctly decided, and then seeks to deter-
mine the proper meaning of homosexuality under section 212(a)(4) of 
the INA. This two-part analysis establishes that the Boutilier Court's 
characterization of "psychopathic personality" as a term of art arises 
from circumstances and concerns that do not apply to ''homosexual-
ity" or "sexual deviation." Consequently, the Court's holding that 
"psychopathic personality" does not lend itself to medical reevalua-
tion should not preclude the PHS from interpreting "homosexuality"· 
and "sexual deviation" in light of congressional intent and advancing 
medical knowledge. 
Prior to Boutilier, two views existed with regard to the meaning of 
"psychopathic personality." The first, to which the Boutilier dissenters 
subscribed, argued that Congress used the expression as a medical term62 
and that homosexuals should be excluded only insofar as they are af-
flicted with the mental condition "psychopathic personality." 63 The 
other view, which ultimately prevailed, asserted that "psychopathic per-
sonality'' represents a term of art64 that Congress employed to_ exclude 
certain classes of aliens, with one such class comprising aliens who 
are homosexual. 65 An examination of the meaning of the term 
"psychopathic personality" in the context of the statute as a whole 
provides the appropriate point of departure in determining the relative 
merits of each _of these opposing arguments. 66 
62. This is never stated explicitly, but Judge Moore urges that a physical examination is re-
quired to establish that the petitioner is a psychopathic personality, even if it has already been 
determined that he is homosexual. 363 F.2d at 496-99. Similarly, Justice Douglas discusses various 
medical definitions of "psychopathic personality" in his dissenting opinion. 387 U.S. at 125-131. 
63. 363 F.2d at 497-98. 
64. See Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (5th Cir. 1961). 
65. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. ll8, 120, 122 (1966). 
66. See, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 535 (1980); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 
707, 713 (1975); United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 385 (1805). See generally 2A 
J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 46.05 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 
1982). 
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The position of "psychopathic personality" within the statute in-
dicates that the term has medical significance. First, section 212(a)(4), 67 
which contains the term, is located among six other medically related 
subsections. 68 Second, section 23469 requires the provision of suitable 
facilities for examining aliens suspected of being excludable under the 
first five of these subsections. 10 Third, section 23411 authorizes the 
Surgeon General to promulgate additional regulations to govern these 
medical examinations. Finally, if a medical officer issues a certificate 
excluding an alien under one of these provisions, section 236(d)12 dic-
tates that the INS must base its decision to exclude solely upon that 
certificate. 
These factors do not, however, dispositively determine that 
"psychopathic personality" constitutes a medical term. The statute pro-
vides the same medical procedures for aliens suspected of being 
"insane"73 as for aliens suspected of being afflicted with "psychopathic 
personality," even though insanity is a legal and not a medical term. 74 
Because the statute fails to clarify the meaning of ''psychopathic per-
sonality," it is necessary to examine the INA's history to determine 
the purpose Congress intended the term to serve. 75 
67. 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(4) (1982). 
68. § 1182. Excludable aliens 
(a) General classes 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the following classes of aliens shall 
be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States: 
(1) Aliens who are mentally retarded; 
(2) Aliens who a~e insane; 
(3) Aliens who have had one or more attacks of insanity; 
(4) Aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental 
defect; 
(5) Aliens who are narcotic drug addicts or chronic alcoholics; 
'(6) Aliens who are afflicted with any dangerous contagious disease; 
(7) Aliens not comprehended within any of the foregoing classes who are certified 
by the examining physician as having a physical defect, disease, or disability, when 
determined by the consular or immigration officer to be of such a nature that it may 
affect the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien affirmatively establishes 
that he will not· have to earn a living; . . .. 
8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(l)-(7) (1982). Section ll82(a)(8), which excludes aliens "who are paupers, pro-
fessional beggars, or vagrants," however, is not a medical exclusion. 
69. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982). 
70. 8 U .S.C. § ll82(a)(l)-(5) (1982). 
71. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982). 
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982). 
73. 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(2) (1982). 
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 714 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) ("INSANITY. The term is a social 
aqd legal term rather than a medical one."). 
75. One may make a distinction between legislative intent and statutory meaning. The former 
looks at the language of the statute from the point of view of the drafter, the latter views it 
from the perspective of those persons whom the legislation will affect. J. SUTHERLAND, supra 
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B. Congressional Intent 
The first version of the proposed INA, introduced in 1950, contained 
a provision specifically requiring the exclusion of homosexual aliens. 76 
In a subsequent draft, 11 the House Judiciary Committee removed this 
provision. Although the Committee allegedly removed the provision 
in respons~ to the recommendations of a PHS report, 78 a close ex-
amination of the report suggests otherwise. Discrepancies exist between 
the PHS position and Congress's interpretation of that position, and 
these discrepancies laid the groundwork for the present controversy. 
1. PHS report- The predominant PHS concern was diagnosability. 79 
Its report indicated that the lack of a reliable laboratory test makes 
substantiating a diagnosis of homosexuality difficult. 80 The report noted, 
however, that more obvious disturbances would come under the 
classifications "psychopathic personality" or "mental defect" found 
in another provision of the proposed statute. 81 Nevertheless, despite 
these comments, it failed to make specific recommendations regarding 
the retention of homosexuality as an explicit exclusionary classification. 82 
The PHS never stated that psychopathic personality, as understood 
note 66, § 45.03. Congress has plenary power with regard to the exclusion of aliens. See Boutilier 
v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 
(1953); Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 
581, 609 (1889). Aliens applying for admission are entitled to procedural, but not substantive 
due process in exclusionary hearings. See supra note 47. It therefore seems reasonable to focus 
on Congress's intent rather than the effect of the statute on· incoming aliens. J. SUTHERLAND, 
supra note 66, § 45.08. This eliminates the option of employing canons of construction which 
regard a term's common meaning as providing a definition preferable to the technical or legal 
meaning. Id. § 47 .27-47 .30, at 137-52. This analysis also can be used to resolve the void-for-
vagueness controversy: if the sole concern is what the legislature meant by the term, then there 
is no reason to examine whether the alien finds it vague. 
76. S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). 
77. S. 2055, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). 
78. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1951); see supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text. 
79. The diagnosability of homosexuality is a recurring issue. In 1979 the PHS said that homosex-
uality is not medically diagnosable. Memorandum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 399 . 
. The possible meanings of this statement will be discussed later. See infra note 151. The difficulty 
does not seem to involve determining, after prolonged analysis, whether an individual is homosexual. 
Rather, the problem consists of developing an accurate, expedient, standardized test for making 
this determination. See, e.g., DeLuca, Performance of Overt Male Homosexuals and Controls 
on Blocky Test, 23 J. CuN1cAL PSYCHOLOGY 497 (1967) (concluding that the Blacky Test does 
not differentiate overt male homosexuals from nonhomosexuals); Goldfried, On the Diagnosis 
of Homosexuality from the Rorschach, 30 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 338 (1966) (concluding 
that the Rorschach test is of limited efficacy); Zamansky, A Technique for Assessing Homosex-
ual Tendencies, 24 J. PERSONALITY 436 (1956) (concluding that overt homosexuals (I} will look 
at a picture of a man relatively longer than will a normal male; (2) will manifest, when compared 
to normal males, a greater attraction to men than to neutral objects; and, (3) subject to limita-
tions, will manifest a greater avoidance of women than will normal males); see also D. WEST, 
HOMOSEXUALITY 48-53 (3d ed. 1968). 
80. PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1701. 
81. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
82. PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1700. 
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by the medical profession, encompassed homosexuality. Instead, the 
PHS noted that persons with sociopathic reactions are afflicted with 
psychopathic personality, and that this group frequently includes in-
dividuals suffering from sexual deviation. 83 Elsewhere in the report the 
PHS stated that ordinarily persons with pathologic behavior such as 
"homosexuality or sexual perversion which includes sexual sadism, 
fetishism, tranvestism and pedophelia" are included within the classifica-
tion "psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality. " 84 The 
modifiers "frequently" in the first statement and "ordinarily" in the 
second imply that not all homosexuals would necessarily come under 
the term "psychopathic personality." When examined in conjunction 
with the difficulty involved in diagnosing homosexuality,8 5 the PHS 
report seems to suggest that the INA should not exclude homosexual 
aliens who exhibit no evidence of "psychopathic personality," "men-
tal defect," or "pathologic sexuality." 
2. Congressional interpretation- A Senate Judiciary Committee 
report 86 noted that the provision excluding aliens afflicted with 
"psychopathic personality" did not specifically provide for the exclu-
sion of homosexual aliens. 87 Nevertheless, the report maintained that 
the change in nomenclature did not modify th·e intent to exclude sex-
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 1701. The ambiguity of this statement casts even greater doubt on the extent to 
which "psychopathic personality" encompasses "homosexuality." It is unclear whether homosex-
uality and/or sexual perversion absent sexual sadism, fetishism, transvestism or pedophilia would 
constitute "pathologic sexuality" for purposes of determining "psychopathic personality." 
85. See supra note 79. The mental examination of an alien consists of an interview by an 
aide who is alert for any unusual sign indicating mental aberration. HousE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., )ST SESS., SPECIAL SERIES No. 12, STUDY OF POPULATION AND IMMIGRA-
TION PROBLEMS, INQUIRY INTO THE ALIEN MEDICAL EXAMINATION PROGRAM OF THE U.S. PUBUC 
HEALTH SERVICE 28 (1963) [hereinafter cited as PHS STUDY). 
86. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The authority of this report is discounted 
in Note, "Psychopathic Personality" and "Sexual Deviation": Medical Terms or Legal Catch-
Alls-Analysis of the Status of the Homosexual Aliens, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 328, 337-39 (1967). The 
author argues that the official legislative history of the Act is H. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1952), since it was the House bill, not the Senate bill, which became law. Id. at 338. The 
House Report states that the medical grounds of exclusion "have been reexamined in the light 
of information made available by the [PHS)." H. REP. No. 1365, 82 Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1693. The Note suggests that the House, therefore, 
intended to incorporate the PHS position that only sexually deviant persons with a more obvious 
mental disturbance (e.g., psychopathic personality) were to be excluded. Note, supra, at 339. 
It is further observed, however, that the House bill eliminated the explicit exclusion of "aliens 
who are homosexuals or sex perverts," although the PHS Report makes no such recommenda-
tion. Id. This inconsistency seems to fndicate that views of the House were tantamount to those 
of the PHS. Since the inquiry seeks to determine what Congress meant, it may be preferable 
to examine the Senate Report. 
87. S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952); accord H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess. 16 (1965) (official legislative history of the 1965 Amendments, citing the 1952 Senate 
Report); s. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 3328, 3337. 
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ually deviant aliens, stating that the PHS had advised the committee 
that the terms "psychopathic personality" and "mental defect" were 
sufficiently broad to provide for the exclusion of ho111osexuals and "sex 
perverts. " 88 Actually, the PHS had asserted that in "instances where 
the disturbance in sexuality may be difficult to uncover, a more ob-
vious disturbance in personality may be encountered which would war-
rant a classification of psychopathic personality or mental defect. " 89 
This discrepency provides the peculiar circumstances that provoked the 
Supreme Court to determine that, in the context of the statute, 
"psychopathic personality" represents a legal term. 
C. Meaning of Boutilier 
Boutilier does not controvert the general authority of the PHS to 
interpret medical terms to reflect advances in medical knowledge. 90 The 
Supreme Court read the Senate Report91 as an expression of Congress's 
desire to exclude homosexual aliens. 92 The Court saw no reason to ques-
tion the report's assertion that the PHS had indicated that "psychopathic 
personality" encompassed "homosexuality," especially in light of the 
PHS having certified Boutilier as excludable. 93 Its concern over the 
psychiatric profession's decision to classify "homosexuality" under a 
heading other than "psychopathic personality" 94 prompted the Court 
88. See supra note 87. 
89. PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1701. The Senate may have looked at the PHS statement 
that "[o]rdinarily, persons suffering from disturbances in sexuality are included within the classifica-
tion of 'psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality.'" Id. The word "ordinarily" fails, 
however, to establish whether homosexual persons will always fall within the classification. 
Moreover, it is not clear that the general classification "psychopathic personality" encompasses 
the classification "psychopathic personality with pathologic sexuality.'' See supra note 84. 
90. Boutilier may, in fact, more strongly support the contention that the Supreme Court 
intended to emphasize the PHS's authority. The PHS guidelines themselves stated that 
"psychopathic personality" represents a legal term. Pulluc HEAI.ra SERVICE, MANuAL FOR MEDICAL 
EXAMINATION OF ALmNS § 6-1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as PHS MANuAL]. Furthermore, the Court 
mentions three times that Congress based its decision on PHS findings and twice that PHS doc-
tors made the determination of Boutilier's homosexuality. 387 U.S. at 122. 
91. Although the Senate Report may not be the official legislative history of the Act, it 
represents the most explicit, most consistent expression of congressional intent available. See 
supra note 86. As such, it is arguably the strongest foundation on which the Boutilier Court 
could have rested its decision. It is interesting to note that neither the Boutilier Court nor the 
petitioners in their brief directly question this report's authority. The citation of the Senate Report 
in the official legislative history of the 1965 amendment, H. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
16 (1965), further weakens the argument against reliance on the report. 
92. 387 U.S. at 120-22. 
93. Id. at 122. 
94. 363 F.2d at 493 n.9, 494 n.11; cf, Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 
F.Supp. 569, 584 (N.D. Cal. 1982), modified sub nom. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 
1983) ("Boutilier authority is not controlling where the medical profession has not changed the 
medical illness label applied to a homosexual ... , but rather has determined that homosexuality 
is no longer a medical illness, mental disorder, or a sexual deviation at all.''). 
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to affirm both congressional intent and PHS policy by fixing the legal 
relationship between these two terms. As such, the decision merely 
represents the repair of a congressional misinterpretation of medical 
terminology - a misinterpretation the PHS supported out of deference 
to congressional intent. 
Ill. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHS POLICY CHANGE 
Congress and the Supreme Court have adopted the position that 
homosexuality is included within "psychopathic personality" and/ or 
"sexual deviation." In order to apply the term "homosexuality" to 
individual aliens, it remains necessary to determine precisely what Con-
gress meant by this term. The statute itself provides no definition of 
"psychopathic personality" or "sexual deviation," much less "homosex-
uality.'' Because a number of definitions of homosexuality exist, 9 s one 
must examine the purpose of Congress's exclusion of homosexual aliens 
in order to ascertain the appropriate meaning. 
A. Medical Nature of the Exclusion 
Although the placement of section 212(a)(4) among a group of medical 
exclusions may create a presumption that the provision's purpose was 
the exclusion of mentally disabled aliens, Congress may have employed 
medical terms to achieve nonmedical objectives. It has been asserted 
that "homosexuality" serves as a term of convenience employed to 
exclude immoral aliens, 96 subversive aliens,9 7 or aliens likely to become 
public charges. 
Although such conjecture is plausible, little evidence suggests that 
95. Homosexuality can be unconscious, pseudo, latent, compulsive or debilitive. S. Wn.us, 
UNDERSTANDING AND COUNSELING THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL 25-39 (1967). A broad definition of 
homosexuality could include at least 370Jo of the American population, A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY 
& C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623 (1948), while the more restrictive 
definition of sexual orientation disturbance, see DSM-II, supra note 7, probably would encom-
pass a much smaller fraction of the.population. See also D. WEST, HOMOSEXUALITY RE-EXAMINED, 
1-2 (1977); D. WEST, supra note 79, at 10-15. 
96. In 1950, the year the first version of the INA was introduced in Congress, the Senate 
passed a resolution authorizing a study and investigation of the federal government's employ-
ment of persons described as "homosexuals and other moral perverts," and of the preparedness 
of the government for the protection of life and property against the threat to security inherent 
in the employment of such perverts. S. Res. 280, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 96 CONG. REc. 8209 
(1950). See Developments, supra note 47, at 1342-48 (implying that the legal nature of the term 
"psychopathic personality" created a per se bar against admitting homosexuals and relying on 
comments made in the 1965 floor debates as evidence that Congress did not exclude homosexual 
aliens solely for medical purposes); see also supra note 60. 
97. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 16 (Rep. Poff) (asserting that the importance of excluding 
homosexual aliens lies not in the immorality involved, but in the susceptibility of homosexuals 
to subversion). The Senate undertook a study of homosexuals and sex perverts as federal employees 
and found them unsuitable and a security risk. See 96 CONG. REC. 16,587 (1950) (presenting 
S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950)); see also D. WEST, supra note 79, at 92-93. 
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this was Congress's purpose. Substantial evidence, however, supports 
the proposition that the exclusion of homosexual aliens sought to pro-
tect exclusively medical interests. Although Congress may have con-
sidered homosexuality morally reprehensible, it failed to reveal such 
a view when it enacted the INA. Each draft of the statute contained 
a group of provisions explicitly denying admission to certain classes 
of immoral aliens, 98 yet in each of these bills, Congress placed the clause 
excluding homosexual aliens among the medical, not moral, exclusions. 
Moreover, the replacement of the terms ''homosexuality'' and ''sex-
ual perversion" with the expression "psychopathic personality" fails 
to evince an intent to exclude homosexual aliens for moral reasons. 
If Congress had truly believed that the exclusion of homosexual aliens 
served a moral purpose, its objective might have been furthered by 
retaining the term "homosexuality," with all its moral overtones, rather 
than by acceding to a PHS medical report and relying instead on 
"psychopathic personality," a: less morally charged term. 
Congress also failed to disclose a morally oriented objective in its 
1965 amendment of the INA. The Fleuti decision, which had prompted 
Congress to reassess its use of "psychopathic ·personality" in section 
212(a)(4), addressed a controversy ultimately based upon conflicting 
medical interpretations of that expression. 99 Again, Congress could have 
resolved this dispute by making clear that homosexuality was a mor_al 
category of exclusion. This could have been accomplished by including 
homosexuality among the other moral exclusions, or at least by an-
nouncing that it used medical terms to achieve a moral end. Instead, 
Congress merely added "sexual deviation," a more precise medical term 
than "psychopathic personality," to section 212(a)(4). 100 
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (19821 provides for the exclusion of aliens involved in certain acts deemed 
immoral. See, e.g., § l 182(a)(9) (crimes involving moral turpitude); § l 182(a)(l0) (habitual 
criminals); § l 182(a)(l l) (polygamists);§ l 182(a)(l2) (prostitutes); § 1182(a)(l3) (immoral sex acts). 
99. Dr. Dahlgren, a PHS physician, and Dr. Harvey, who represented Fleuti, disagreed as 
to the propriety of classifying Fleuti as a psychopathic personality. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 
F.2d 652, 657-58 (9th Cir. 1962), remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). 
100. The remarks of two congressmen on the House floor provide the strongest evidence 
of a nonmedical purpose behind Congress's exclusion of homosexual aliens. Rep. Gilbert stated 
that the 1965 Amendment would assure the exclusion of physically or morally unfit persons. 111 
CoNo. REc. 21,771 (1965). Since the only changes affecting § 212(a) were (1) the replacement 
of "feebleminded" with "mentally retarded," (2) the deletion of "epilepsy," (3) the addition of 
"sexual deviation," and (4) an alteration of the exclusion of aliens with communicable diseases 
and past mental illness, 79 Stat. at 919, one can infer that moral unfitness applied to sexual deviation. 
Rep. Poff referred to sexual deviation as a disgraceful affliction. 111 CoNo. REc. 21,772 (1965). 
It is interesting to note, however, that the 1917 Act excluded aliens afflicted with "loathsome" 
contagious diseases, and that the first version of the INA also used that term. It seems unlikely 
that the use of this pejorative modifier was intended to alter the medical nature of that exclusion. 
The statements of these two congressmen, especially Rep. Gilbert's explicit reference to moral 
unfitness, must be accorded some probative weight, but they are by no means dispositive evidence 
of congressional purpose. Generally, statements made during floor debates are inadmissable in 
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When it passed the INA, Congress's concerns included the exclu-
sion of aliens likely to engage in subversive activities. 101 Although some 
evidence suggests that Congress believed homosexual persons presented 
a greater security risk than heterosexual persons, 102 there is no evidence 
suggesting that this concern prompted Congress to exclude homosex-
ual aliens. In fact, Congress explicitly provided for the exclusion of 
potential subversives in comprehensive provisions elsewhere in the 
statute. 103 
Similarly, although the entry of aliens afflicted with mental disorders 
that render them unable to earn a living had also· been a longstanding 
concern of Congress, 104 nothing indicates that the exclusion of aliens 
afflicted with "psychopathic personality" was designed to eliminate 
construing a statute, but remarks made by a committee member are given some weight. United 
States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106 (1948) (where doubt exists as to the meaning 
of a statute, informed congressional discussion should not be disregarded.); United States v. 
St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 247 U.S. 310, 318 (1918). Both Reps. Poff and Gilbert were members 
of the House Judiciary Committee which reported the bill, and Rep. Gilbert served on the Sub-
committee on Immigration and Nationality as well. The importance of such statements is greater 
in instances like this, where they concern the history at the time of enactment, the purpose of 
the bill, or the evil to be remedied rather than the meaning of the language itself. Humphrey's 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935); Standard Oil Co. v. United States; 221 
U.S. 1, 50 (1911). 
Nevertheless, these are isolated comments that may represent no more than personal opinion. 
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) (debates in Congress expressive 
of the views of individual members should not be resorted to in determining congressional mean-
ing and purpose). The testimony before the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee which 
provoked the addition of the expression "sexual deviation" bore no indications of a moral pur-
pose, Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 2580 Before the Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 150-52 (1965), nor did the original Act which Congress 
intended to clarify with this amendment. 
The Supreme Court maintains that an "isolated remark by a single Senator, ambiguous in 
meaning when examined in context, is insufficient to establish [an] affirmative congressional 
expression." Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982). Even a remark by a sponsor of legisla-
tion, although accorded substantial weight, Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 
426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976), is not controlling in analyzing legislative history. Weinberger, 456 U.S. 
at 35 n.15; see also Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 
(1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,311 (1979). Thus, the isolated comments of Reps. 
Poff and Gilbert, ambiguous in light of these representatives' acknowledgement of the amend-
ment's medical nature, see supra note 60, do not merit recognition as expressions of congressional 
intent. 
101. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 and Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 were 
designed to combat sedition and subversion. H. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1653, 1673-74. The INA was intended to provide a 
more thorough screening of aliens likely to be security risks or subversives. Id. at 1679. 
102. The interim report from an investigation of homosexual persons in government con-
cluded that overt homosexuals and other sex perverts should not be tolerated in government 
service because they are generally unsuitable and, futhermore, constitute security risks. 96 CONG. 
REc. 16,587 (1950) (presenting S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950)); see also supra note 97. 
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)-(29) (1982). 
104. As early as 1882 Congress enacted a law excluding aliens likely to become public charges. 
Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214. Such provisions have continued to the 
present. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (1982). 
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this problem. Indeed, another section of the statute explicitly addresses 
this concern. 105 
The purpose of the ''psychopathic personality'' exclusion was to 
"keep out 'tainted blood,' that is, 'persons who have medical traits 
that would harm the people of the United States if these traits were 
introduced in this country.' " 106 This statement does not clarify the ex-
act nature of the harm anticipated, but such medical harm seems to 
bear little relation to the problem of aliens becoming public charges. 10 ' 
Thus, though questions of morality, subversion, or destitution may 
have motivated Congress to act, 108 the evidence of such intentions is 
inadequate to override the manifestly medical nature of the provision. 
B. PHS Role in the Exclusion of Aliens 
Another area of contention in determining the excludability of 
homosexual aliens is the requirement of section 236(d) that, if a medical 
officer has certified an alien excludable, then the decision to exclude 
shall be based solely upon that certification. 109 The Ninth Circuit main-
tains that a medical certificate constitutes an indispensable_prerequisite 
to exclusion, 110 while the Fifth Circuit contends that an applicant's ad-
mission of homosexuality suffices to establish excludability. 111 Neither 
assertion entirely corresponds with Congress's statutory scheme, and 
both avoid the pivotal question of the PHS authority in the exclu-
sionary process. The great weight of evidence suggests, however, that 
the exclusion of aliens on medical grounds does not necessarily _de-
mand a medical certificate, but that no alien can be excluded in disregard 
of PHS policy. · 
105. "Aliens ... who are certified ... as having a physical defect, disease, or disability 
... of such a nature that it may affect the ability of the alien to earn a living [shall be excluded 
from admission) unless the alien affirmatively establishes that he will not have to earn a living." 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (1982). 
106. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1950) (emphasis added). The Immigration 
Service espouses this purpose. The Committee on the Judiciary added that the classification "con-
stitutional psychopathic inferiority" (later to become "psychopathic personality''.) was designed 
to prevent the entry of aliens with "an inherent likelihood of becoming mental cases." Id. 
107. Congress allowed an exception to the exclusion in § 1182(a)(7) for aliens who would 
not hav.e to support themselves. The absence of such an exception in § I 182(a)(4) indicates that 
the purpose of excluding aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality goes beyond a concern 
that the alien not become a public charge. 
108. One commentator looks to a remark by one congressman in floor debates to conclude 
that the implicit assumption made in Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day (the district court decision in 
Hill v. INS) and Boutilier, that the psychopathic personality exclusion is a medical one, is flaw~d. 
See Developments, supra note 47, at 1346. The possibility that Congress had ulterior motives 
for enacting a statute, however, would not seem to control that statute's construction when the 
actual words, context, and legislative history of the law fail to confirm those motives. 
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982). 
110. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Ill. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1448 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3861 
(May 29, 1984). 
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1. Necessity of medical certification- The wording of section 236(d) 
requires the exclusion of aliens under section 212(a)(l)-(7) 112 to rest upon 
medical certification when such certification is available. 113 Because of 
the prior availability of medical certificates, the issue of exclusion 
without certification had little significance. To determine the necessity 
of medical certification in light of the present PHS policy, it becomes 
essential first to examine the relationship of certification to the overall 
system of proof in the exclusion process. 
Any alien not clearly entitled to enter the United States may be de-
tained for further inquiry. 114 In a subsequent exclusionary hearing that 
alien assumes the burden of proving admissibility. 115 This policy reflects 
the position that admission into the United States is a privilege that 
an alien must merit} 16 Although this burden falls short of requiring 
the alien to introduce clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence111 
that none of the thirty-three exclusionary categories apply, 118 an alien's 
admission of facts evincing inadmissibility has been deemed a suffi-
cient basis on which to exclude. 119 
To argue that a medical certificate constitutes an indispensable re-
quirement for exclusion, 120 the Ninth Circuit relied on a series of cases 
112. These provisions contain the INA's medical exclusions. See supra note 68. 
113. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949) (holding a board 
of special inquiry bound to accept as final a certificate that an alien is a mental defective where 
a medical appeal board has issued such certificate after a fair hearing); United States ex rel. 
Wulf v. Esperdy, 277 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that an alien's inability to rebut findings 
in the certificate does not deny due process). 
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (1982). Medical certificates are issued only if immigration officials 
clearly establish the presence of a disease or defect. 42 C.F.R. § 34.4 (1983); S. REP. No. 1515, 
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 339 (1950). If a medical decision must be made where the record is incomplete, 
it is the responsibility of the applicant to provide information to rule out the possibility of his 
excludability. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 29. 
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). The government, however, assumes the burden of proof in depor-
tation proceedings. Id. 
116. The shift in the burden of proof from the alien to the government is also consistent 
with the greater due process safeguards afforded in deportation proceedings. See supra note 47. 
111. In re Arthur, 16 I. & N. Dec. 558 (BIA 1978); In re Moore, 13 I. & N. Dec. 711 (BIA 
1971). This is the standard of proof required of the government in deportation proceedings. 
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966). 
118. These 33 categories are set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982). 
119. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner oflmmigration, 273 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1927) 
(holding admission of intent to overthrow the government sufficient evidence for purpose of 
exclusion). 
120. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1983). The Hill court relies on questionable 
authority for its contention that a medical certificate is indispensable. That authority, In re Holl-
inger, 211 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Mich. 1962), asserted that a medical certificate provided the only 
evidence upon which a finding of insanity could be made for the purpose of excluding an alien. 
This statement, however, represented only one of two alternative bases for the case's holding. 
Furthermore, the Hollinger court offered no explanation or support for its comment; it merely 
presented the proposition in a conclusory fashion. The district court in Hill, Lesbian/Gay Freedom 
Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 580 (N.D. Cal. 1982), stated that this conclusion 
in Hollinger was the holding of the case. The Fifth Circuit, in In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 
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that interpret section 236(d) to preclude the introduction of evidence 
by the alien to rebut the PHS's certification. 121 If Congress provided 
medical examinations for aliens in order to safeguard the opportunity 
of these aliens for admission, then the Ninth Circuit's contention would 
have merit. In effect, Congress would thereby gratuitously grant aliens 
a procedural due process right. If, however, Congress intended medical 
examinations to act as nothing more than an expeditious screening pro-
cedure, perfor.med for the benefit of the United States in its effort 
to exclude undesirable aliens, then section 236(d) might seek only to 
accelerate exclusionary proceedings by denying the alien the right to 
contest medical evidence brought against him by the PHS. 
The available evidence indicates that Congress intended the examina-
tion to serve primarily as an expeditious screening procedure. First, 
Congress does not seem to have been concerned with establishing pro-
cedural protections. The precise language of section 236(d) implies that 
medical certification proves dispositive when.available, but it does not 
explicitly require such certification. 122 Furthermore, section 236(d) denies 
the alien an appe_al of an INS decision based on such certification. 123 
Second, because not all incoining aliens receive a full medical examina-
tion, it appears that the examination acts primarily as a screening 
device. 124 Moreover, the failure of a medical exaininer to find a defect 
during the initial examination does not prevent the PHS from later 
determining that the alien had been excludable; the INS does not con-
sider the amount of time that has elapsed between the initial entry 
and any subsequent determination of _excludability. 125 
1444 n.27 (5th Cir. 1983), however, refers to it as dictum. The Ninth Circuit fails to bolster the 
reasoning behind Hollinger, maintaining instead only that it finds the case "persuasive." 714 F .2d 
1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983). 
121. 714 F.2d 1470, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1983). The court relies on United States ex rel. Johnson 
v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806 (1949); United States ex rel. Saclarides v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 
687, 688 (2d Cir. 1950) (follows Johnson); United States ex rel. Wulf v. Esperdy, 277 F.2d 537 
(2d Cir. 1960); see supra note 113. · 
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982). 
123. Id. An appeal is permitted, however, to seek admission under bond pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1183 where the defect is physical. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEws 1653-, 1711. An alien also has a right to bring an appeal 
of any medical decision before a PHS appeals board. 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982). 
124. Medical inspections serve to screen the population from exdudable diseases, bring signifi-
cant cases to the attention of the INS, and deter medically excludable aliens from entering this 
country. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 22, 38, 48; see also.United States ex rel. Wulf v. Esperdy, 
277 F.2d 537, 538 (2d Cir. 1960) (noting that the apparent purpose of section 236(d) was to 
provide a summary proceeding). Immigrants and five percent of nonimmigrants receive medical 
examinations when they apply for visas; all other aliens are subject only to less thorough medical 
inspections at their ports of entry. PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 9-11, 27. 
125. See, e.g., Canciamilla v. Haff, 64 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1933); In re Vallejos, 14 I. & N. 
Dec. 68 (BIA 1972); In re LaRochelle, 11 I. & N. Dec. 436, 438 (BIA 1965); In re A-, 8 I. & 
N. Dec. 12 (BIA 1958) (medical certificate not required for deportation); accord Santiago v. INS. 
526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975) (validity of visa), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Alarcon-
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2. PHS rule-making authority- Congress divided the authority to 
regulate the medical examination of aliens between the PHS and INS; 
it charged the PHS with preparing medical regulations and the INS 
with prescribing administrative regulations. 126 The PHS exercises plenary 
power to evaluate the medical condition of aliens. 121 When medical 
certification is available, Congress has denied the INS the authority 
to base a medical exclusion on any other criteria. 128 Moreover, Con-
gress explicitly established a procedure for resolving appeals of medical 
decisions wholly within the PHS. 129 The medical expertise of the PHS 
forms the basis for its autonomy. 130 The INS itself recognized this ex-
pertise, noting the authority of the PHS to issue additional instruc-
tions and guidelines for performing examinations, 131 and limiting its 
own administrative role to establishing procedures for selecting non-
PHS physicians to perform medical examinations in places where PHS 
officers are not available. 132 
3. Validity of the PHS rule- The PHS policy of refusing to cer-
tify homosexual aliens as excludable constitutes an administrative rule. 133 
Having been informally promulgated, 134 this rule does not have the 
Baylon v. Brownell, 250 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1957) (draft evader). See generally Gordon, Finality 
of Immigration and Nationality Determinations-Can the Government Be £stopped?, 31 U. Cm. 
L. REV. 433 (1964); Annot., 31 A.L.R. FED. 900 (1977). 
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1982). This division dates back to the Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. 
L. No. 64-301, § 15, 39 Stat.' 874, 885. Medical inspection by Marine Hospital Service (forerunner 
of the PHS) officers was a part of the 1891 Act. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 38, 26 Stat. 
1084, 1085. 
127. Congress has taken note of the crucial importance of this medical determination 
by prescribing certain minimal procedural requirements that the [PHS] must follow . 
. . . · In order that further safeguards might be provided, Congress authorized the Surgeon 
General ... to prescribe additional regulations governing the procedure to be observed 
in exercise of [the] Service's exclusive authority over medical questions. 
United States ex rel. Johnson v. Shaughnessy, 336 U.S. 806, 810 (1949) (emphasis added). 
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(d) (1982). 
129. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982). 
130. "Of course practical questions should be determined by the immigration officials, but 
questions of purely medical nature must be determined by members of the medical profession." 
S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917), cited in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Watkins, 
170 F.2d 1009, 1012 (2d Cir. 1948). 
131. 8 C.F.R. § 234.2(a) (1983). 
132. 8 C.F.R. § 234.2(b)-(c) (1983). The Ninth Circuit implicitly found that the PHS had 
exclusive autp.ority to determine which aliens to exclude for medical reasons. Hill v. INS, 714 
F.2d 1470, 1480 (1983). This Note directly examines the authority of the PHS to formulate policy 
without relying solely on its role in prov.iding the INS with medical certificates. 
133. The term "rule" has a broad meaning. One commentator notes that "[a)II 'rules' could 
be lined up on a scale from unthinking habits of a single employee at a low level to the most 
formal 'rules' published in the Code of Federal Regulations." 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE§ 7:1, at 3 (2d ed. 1979). In this instance, the PHS first issued a memorandum outlining 
its new policy, Memorandum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 398-99, and then incor-
porated this policy in its Guidelines for Diagnosis of Mental Conditions, the successor to the 
PHS MANUAL, supra note 90. 
134. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that notice of proposed rule making be given 
in the case of substantive or legislative rules. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 
Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982)). 
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force of statutory law. 135 Unlike a statute, the validity of an interpretative 
rule is subject to the discretion of the reviewing court and "will de-
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it the power to persuade." 136 Courts 
ordinarily uphold an agency regulation if the rule is reasonable and 
not inconsistent with the statute itself. 137 
A close examination of the foundations and operation of the PHS 
regulation establishes its validity. The PHS decision to discontinue its 
practice of issuing certificates for the purpose of excluding homosex-
ual aliens rested on two bases. First, the policy change reflected "cur-
rent and generally accepted canons of medical practice with respect 
to homosexuality," 138 and second, "the determination of homosexuality 
is not made through a medical diagnostic procedure." 139 The 
reasonableness of this decision depends upon the authority of the PHS 
to change a regulation in accordance with new medical knowledge as 
well as the merits of this particular change. 
Although Congress never explicitly indicated whether the PHS could 
revise its regulations in response to medical advances, the PHS 
periodically updated its diagnostic guidelines to conform with current 
medical opinion. 140 This ability to revise appears consistent with Con-
gress's implicit intent. In enacting the statutes, Congress repeatedly 
sought information regarding current medical knowledge to help for-
mulate its legislation. 141 Congress relied exclusively on the PHS to pro-
135. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7:8, at 36-43 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1982). 
136. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
137. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 
381 (1969) (holding that, with regard to an FCC regulation, the "venerable principle that the 
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there 
are compelling indications that it is wrong"); Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 
375, 378 (193 I) (holding that a tax regulation made "pursuant to express authority" was "valid 
unless unreasonable or inconsistent with statute"). 
138. Memorandum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 398. 
139. Id. at 399. 
140. The PHS issued Guidelines for the Diagnosis of Mental Conditions in 1973 and 1981 
to update its PHS MANUAL, supra note 90. The diagnosis of narcotic drug addiction 
provides an example of the revisions the PHS made. The Manual merely stated that "(a) nar-
cotic drug addict is any person who habitually uses any habit-forming narcotic drugs so as to 
endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or ... [has] lost the power of self-con-
trol with the drug." Id. at 6-7. The 1973 revision requires "evidence of habitual use and (a] 
clear ... need for the drug in order to continue the normal level of functioning" to substantiate 
this diagnosis and suggests the use of the Nalline test. AMERICAN PsYCIDATRIC AssOCIATION, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited 
as DSM-Ill], is relied on in the 1981 guidelines. Evidence of tolerance to the drug and symptoms 
of withdrawal are necessary to support a diagnosis of this condition. 
141. Rep. Walter, sponsor of the 19S2 McCarran-Walter Act, asked the Pl:IS for comments 
on the bill's medical aspects. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 19S2 U.S. 
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1699. In hearings pursuant to a.House Study, Rep. Poff asked 
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vide this information, which it invariably incorporated into the bill 
under consideration. 1' 2 Knowing that medical knowledge does not 
stagnate between enactments of legislation, Congress's explicit alloca-
tion to the PHS of the authority to prepare medical regulations 1' 3 seems 
to provide the agency with the power to revise its policy in light of 
medical advances, if not to require it to do so. The alternative, to compel 
practicing physicians to retain obsolete medical standards, seems ab-
surd in comparison. 1 ' ' 
The reasonableness of the PHS policy change should be examined 
in light of the medical authority supporting it. The initial removal of 
homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manua/1' 5 aroused vehement debate within 
the psychiatric community, 146 factions of which still contest the 
change. 147 The PHS did not, however, alter its policy during this tur-
a PHS physician if and how § 212(a)(4) of the INA should be amended so as to be certain 
of excluding homosexual aliens and "sex perverts." PHS STUDY,_ supra note 85, at 15. 
142. Although Congress may not have understood what the PHS was saying, see supra text 
accompanying notes 76-89, it believed it was following PHS advice when it dropped the terms 
"homosexuals and sex perverts" from its immigration bill. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 
2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653, 1699, 1702. It also adopted 
the suggestion of PHS physician Dr. Jacobs, PHS STUDY, supra note 84, at 15, that "ss:xual 
deviation" would comprise "homosexuality" and "sexual perversion." S. REP. No. 748, 89th 
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328, 3337. 
143. 8 u.s.c. § 1224 (1982). 
144. Justice Cardozo laments that statutory construction is "often a choice between uncer-
tainties. We must be content to choose the lesser." Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 288 
(1933). "To arrive at a decision, we have therefore to put to ourselves the question, which choice 
is it the more likely that Congress would have made?" Id. at 285. If the PHS had told Congress 
that homosexuality is not a psychiatric disorder and that physicians have no expertise in diagnos-
ing it, two outcomes seem plausible. First, Congress might have listed homosexuality as a moral 
exclusion, or, second, Congress might have tried to exclude on medical grounds sexually perverted 
or deviant persons, but not homosexual aliens. It seems unlikely that Congress would have told 
the PHS that, as a matter of legislative fact, homosexuality was a disease and the PHS must 
diagnose it as such. 
145. DSM-II, supra note 7. 
146. See Green, Homosexuality as a Mental Illness, l O INT'L. J. PSYCHIATRY 77 ( 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as Green, Homosexuality]; Bell, Critical Evaluation: Human Sexuality-A Response, 10 
INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 99 (1972); Hatteret, Critical Evaluation: A Critique, 10 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 
103 (1972); Hoffman, Critical Evaluation: Philosophic, Empirical, and Ecological Remarks, IO 
INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 105 (1972); Karlen, Critical Evaluation: A Discussion of "Homosexuality 
as a Mental Illness," IO INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 108 (1972); Marmor, Critical Evaluation: 
Homosexuality-Mental Illness or Moral Dilemma?, 10 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 114 (1972); Socarides, 
Critical Evaluation: Homosexuality-Basic Concepts and Pschodynamics, IO INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 
118 (1972); Green, Author's Reply, lO INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 126 (1972); see also Should Homosex-
uality Be in the APA Nomenclature?, supra note 7. 
147. A leading critic of the APA's position cites a 1977 study in which 680Jo of 10,000 
psychiatrists who were asked "Is homosexuality usually a pathological adaptation (as opposed 
to a normal variation)?" responded in the affirmative. Socarides, The Sexual Deviations and 
the Diagnostic Manual, 32 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 414, 424-25 (1978); see also Gnepp, Biology, 
Mental 1//ness and Homosexuality: A Comment on Public Affairs, 12 PsYCHOLOOY 60 (1975). 
For an enunciation of the APA's current position, see Bayer & Spitzer, Edited Correspondence 
on the Status of Homosexuality in DSM-III, 18 J. HIST. BEHAVIORAL Sc1. 32 (1982); Spitzer, 
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bulent period. Instead it waited until a new edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manua/148 affirmed the revision. Furthermore, the PHS 
listed other health organizations that had endorsed the AP A's 
position. 149 Although unanimity among psychiatrists may not exist with 
regard to the classification of homosexuality, given the medical 
expertise150 of the PHS and the existence of significant support for 
the reclassification of homosexuality, the PHS rule incorporating this 
new policy seems reasonable. 151 
Although the PHS policy may be reasonable, to acquire the force 
of law it must also comply with the congressional intent 152 underlying 
the statutory exclusion of aliens afflicted with "psychopathic personal-
ity" or "sexual deviation." To understand the relationship between 
the PHS rule and congressional intent, it is necessary to examine the 
nature of the PHS policy change in light of that intent. The AP A 
reevaluation of homosexuality has aspects of both scient.ific inquiry 153 
Commentary-The Diagnostic Status of Homosexuality in DSM-III: A Reformulation of the 
Issues, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 210 (1981). 
148. DSM-III, supra note 140. 
149. These organizations include the American Psychological Associaton, the American Public 
Health Association, the American Nurses' Association, and the Council of Advanced Practi-
tioners in Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing of the American Nurses' Association. Memoran-
dum of the Surgeon General, supra note 8, at 398. 
ISO. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. 
151. The PHS also based its policy change on the determination that homosexuality was 
not a medical diagnosis. The INS relies on this to conclude that it has authority to make a 
determination of homosexuality. In re Hill, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2873, at 5-8 (July 9, 1981). 
Given the difficulty of establishing a diagnosis of homosexu_ality, S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess. 3-41, 343-44 (1950); PHS REPORT, supra note 28, at 1701, one could argue that after 
more than 20 years of excluding homosexual aliens, see supra note 42, the PHS had, independently 
of the the APA's change in position, decided that the diagnosis of homosexuality was too dif-
ficult to make. It might even be argued that the PHS used the AP A change as an excuse to 
justify the elimination of an exclusion it had never liked. The diagnosis of homosexuality, in 
the absence of reliable objective tests, see supra note 79, however, seems no more problematic 
than a determination of a history of insanity. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3) (1982). Both involve a sub-
jective evaluation of an alien's response to questions. This similarity reduces the likelihood that 
the PHS found the diagnosis of homosexuality, but not a past history of insanity, nonmedical. 
The absence of any evidence that the PHS has acted in bad faith further weakens the cynic's 
argument. Thus, the contention that the PHS determination that homosexuality was not a medical 
diagnosis depended upon the APA's change in position appears more plausible than the INS 
view of diagnosability implicit in /n re Hill. 
152. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (noting that courts need not 
defer to an agency's rule if it is inconsistent with obvious congressional intent or there are com-
pelling indications that the rule is wrong); cf. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 
342, 349 (1920) (holding that an agency's administrative rule has the force of law unless it con-
flicts with an express statutory provision). 
153. A set of studies examining the prevalence of psychopathology in homosexual men and 
women released three years before the APA nomenclature revealed only slight differences in 
occurrences of these psychopathologies in homosexual and heterosexual persons. Saghir, Robins, 
Walbran, and Gentry, Homosexuality: Ill. Psychiatric Disorder and Disability in the Male 
Homosexual, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1079 (1970); Saghir, Robins, Walbran, and Gentry, Homosex-
uality. IV. Psychiatric Disorders and Disability in the Female Homosexual, 127 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
147 (1970). 
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and moral judgment. 1 54 The consistency of the PHS policy with con-
gressional intent depends upon the relationship between these two aspects 
of that reevaluation. 
The AP A reclassification may be read to assert that homosexuality 
is not a disorder itself, but merely a condition abnormal in a statistical 
sense. 155 This approach maintains that, because inquiry into a person's 
sexual orientation had almost exclusively accompanied a finding of men-
tal disorder, the psychiatric profession erroneously assumed that 
homosexuality must itself be a disorder. 156 Upon closer examination, 
however, psychiatrists discovered that not all homosexuals possessed 
these other disorders. 157 In light of their medical expertise, they decided 
that homosexuality per se did not constitute a disorder. 158 This conclu-
sion may involve a moral judgment, but it is a moral judgment the 
medical community has always been allowed to make. 159 Society 
delegates it the authority to determine whether a particular set of 
behaviors or a certain physical characteristic warrants the epithet 
"disease." Society assumes that the moral standards of the medical 
profession sufficiently resemble those of the community as a whole 
to permit that profession to determine, for example, that alcoholism 
154. A participant in the APA classification debate published an article three years before the 
APA took up the issue of the psychiatric status of homosexuality. The author contends that 
homosexuality is a medical disorder that has reached epidemiological proportions and that re-
mains subject to wide social condemnation. The study observes that "(p]olls have shown that 
the majority of the public still favors legal punishment for homosexual acts even if performed 
in private," and that "homosexuality is considered more harmful to society than adultery and 
even abortion with its actual threat to life." Socarides, Homosexuality and Medicine, 212 J. 
A.M.A. 1199 (1970). 
155. Some support exists for the proposition that homosexuality is not even statistically ab-
normal. See Green, Homosexuality, supra note 146, at 85-87. 
156. Homosexuality probably has a tendency to go unseen in persons without other psychiatric 
disorders and to appear in those manifesting these other disorders. A medical examination offers 
only a brief inquiry into the alien's sexual preference. In addition, privacy and fear of- social 
censure would keep aliens from volunteering this information. 
157. See supra note 153. 
158. Although the PHS never states that this analysis represents its interpretation of the APA 
decision, this analysis is, nonetheless, most consistent with the scientific method. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the AP A simply made the moral judgment that homosexuality is not immoral. 
Whether this is what the APA did may not be as important as what the PHS thought the APA 
did. If the PHS was knowingly adopting the moral fiat of the APA, then it arguably was operating 
outside the scope of its medical authority. Absent contrary evidence, however, it should be pre-
sumed, in deference to the medical expertise of the PHS, that the service was relying on the 
scientific, medical analysis outlined in the text. · 
159. Green, Homosexuality, supra note 146, at 78 (arguing that psychiatrists usually are granted 
the prerogative of determining what behaviors to diagnose as mental illness, and that through 
mere consensus, they so designated homosexuality) (quoting M. HOFFMAN, THE GAY WORLD: 
MALE HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE SOCIAL CREATION OF EVIL (1968)). This argument allows for the 
possibility that homosexuality could again be deemed an illness if new scientific evidence emerged 
which changes its relationship with other mental disorders or the medical community changed 
its moral outlook. 
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but not cigarette smoking requires psychiatric treatment. Of course the 
profession's conclusion that some forms of behavior, such as prostitu-
tion, do not constitute a disease does not preclude society from deem-
ing them immoral, but only indicates that the characteristic or behavior 
stands outside the expertise of the medical profession. 160 
This line of reasoning suggests that the PHS rule complies with con-
gressional intent. Congress's continuing association of homosexuality 
with sexual perversion and sexual deviation 161 provides a basis for the 
contention that Congress was doing no more than expressing the then-
current medical opinion that homosexuality always signified the presence 
of one of these other psychiatric disorders. Accordingly, Congress would 
have wanted homosexuality dropped as an exclusionary condition when 
the psychiatric community established that homosexuality did not 
necessarily constitute evidence of a medically recognized disorder. 
C. Effect of the Rule on the INS 
The INS disagreed with the policy the PHS adopted regarding the 
exclusion of homosexual aliens. 162 Under the INS interpretation of the 
INA, the PHS possesses the power to "promulgate policies regarding 
the description and diagnosis of disease," 163 except in cases in which 
Congress has already defined the term. 164 With regard to diagnosabil-
ity, the INS concedes that the legislature may not alter a determina-
tion by the Surgeon General that a particular disease is not medically 
diagnosable.. The INS asserts, however, that it cannot evaluate the 
diagnosability of homosexuality. 16 ' The INS concludes that, despite the 
160. One could argue that the determination of whether to classify a behavior as a mental 
disorder turns on whether the conduct injures someone other than the actor. This analysis sug-
gests that alcoholism is psychiatrically treated because of auto accidents caused by drunk 
drivers. Similarly, cigarette smoking is not deemed a disease, since it generally injures only the 
actor. This line of reasoning, however, does not account for the treatment of a great many neuroses, 
despite the fact that neurotic persons can be very pleasant and may exhibit no peculiar propen-
sity for harming others. 
161. S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. § 212(a)(7) (1950), the first version of the INA, included 
homosexuals and sex perverts in the same section. The report accompanying the bill emphasizes 
the connection, saying "the classes of mentally defectives should be enlarged to include homosexuals 
and other sex perverts." S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 345 (1950). When Congress eliminated 
the explicit exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts it noted that the change did not modify 
its "intent to exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates." S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 9 (1952). This language was reiterated in the report accompanying the 1965 Amendment. 
S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 196S U.S. CooE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3328, 
3337; see also PHS STUDY, supra note 85, at 14-15. 
162. See Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9; Press Release, supra note 9. 
163. Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9, at 574. 
164. Id. The INS contends that Congress's classification of homosexuality as a disease 
represented a definition of that term and that the PHS lacked the authority to redefine it. 
165. Id. at 577 n.5. 
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PHS policy, homosexual aliens remain subject to exclusion, and that 
an admission of homosexuality166 suffices to warrant exclusion. 167 
This view contains two serious flaws. First, the INS concession that 
Congress cannot alter medical facts, including the diagnosability of 
a particular disease, may conflict with the contention that a congres-
sional definition of a disease cannot be revised. For example, Con-
gress might charge the PHS with certifying as excludable those alie!JS 
afflicted with contagious diseases of the scalp, and the legislative history 
of this Act. might enumerate psoriasis as one such disease. Since the 
PHS knows, as a matter of medical fact, that psoriasis is not con-
tagious, this congressional definition of a disease could have no medical 
significance. More to the point, if Congress had relied on the erroneous 
advice of the PHS in formulating "its exclusion of persons with con-
tagious psoriasis, this "affliction" would not remain in any useful sense 
a disease after the PHS discovered its error. 168 Moreover, a person 
who still thought his psoriasis was contagious; and disclosed this con-
dition to the INS, would not merit exclusion. 
Although the APA reevaluation of homosexuality does not rest on 
as clear a factual error as does the above example, 169 . the illustration 
indicates that reliance on medical experts for the determination of 
medical facts may have an impact on the evaluation of a congressional 
medical definition. The unyielding position of the INS fails to accom-
modate the possibility of a medical advance rendering a definition in 
a statute or legislative history erroneous. 
Second, the INS inappropriately minimizes the role the PHS played 
in the initial definition of the mental disorders. Congress relied on the 
PHS to provide information regarding the definitions of "psychopathic 
personality" and "sexual deviation." 110 Instead of stating that Con-
gress defined these terms, it would be more accurate to assert that the 
166. This policy, see supra note 9 and accompanying text, conflicts with the INS's previous 
administrative practice of requiring.a medical examination and certificate for exclusion on medical 
grounds. Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1477 n.9 (9th Cir. 1983). 
167. Press Release, supra note 9, at 441. 
168. The INS recognized the changing interpretation of homosexuality, saying "[i]t may 
reasonably be inferred that Congress intended homosexuality to be defined in light of current 
knowledge and social mores." Memorandum of Attorney General, supra note 9, at 581. This 
assertion seems to provide support for the PHS policy change. The INS contends that PHS 
may alter the definitions of diseases and that Congress intended the definition of homosexuality 
to be revised, but that the PHS revision of homosexuality is unauthorized. The INS may be 
objecting to the extent of the PHS revision, a revision which resembles an abolition rather than 
an alteration. If, however, the factors of "current knowledge" and "social mores" warrant such 
a drastic redefinition it is difficult to see what, in the view of the INS, precludes it. 
169. The contagious psoriasis argument does not reflect the nature of the APA reevaluation 
of homosexuality. Although factual evidence contesting the classification of homosexuality as 
a disease was involved in this reevaluation, see supra note 153, there were some moral considera-
tions as well; see supra notes 154 & 160; text accompanying notes 159-60. 
170. See supra notes 141-42. 
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PHS defined them and that Congress adopted those definitions, giv-
ing the PHS explicit authority to prepare subsequent regulations. It 
seems somewhat inconsistent that the INS infers that it is authorized 
to "promulgate definitions and implement policies that reflect con-
temporary assessments of 'immoral purpose' and 'moral turpitude''' 
because Congress did not define these terms, yet maintains that when 
Congress included homosexuality within the term "psychopathic per-
sonality" in explicit reliance on PHS medical advice, it intended to 
preclude the PHS from redefining that term in light of new medical 
knowledge. 111 
Because of the inconsistencies of the INS position, the PHS policy 
represents a preferable interpretation of section 212(a)(4) of the INA. 
Although the INS bears the responsibility for excluding aliens under 
that section, the medical determination of the PHS that homosexual-
ity is not a mental disorder renders the alien's admission of homosex-
uality irrelevant to the issue of exclusion. 
IV. CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTROVERSY 
The current disagreement regarding the PHS role in the exclusion 
process may have no appreciable impact on this country's exclusion 
and deportation practices. The present INS criterion for excluding 
homosexual aliens requires that the alien make an unsolicited, unam-
biguous disclosure of his or her homosexuality. 112 Consequently, this 
policy allows homosexual aliens to enter the United States at will without 
having to make any misrepresentations concerning their sexual 
orientation. 113 Although the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the INA 
171. Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9, at 576 n.4. The INS contention 
that the PHS cannot ignore the congressional definition of a disease has merit, and the INS 
cites cases which stand for the proposition that agencies cannot make rules which are inhar-
monious with congressional intent, Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 
134 (1936), or congressional purpose, United States v. Larinoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 & n.12 (1977). 
Memorandum of Attorney General, supra note 9, at 574. Although Congress arguably gave 
"specific meaning," id., to "psychopathic personality" by including homosexuality within it, 
it failed to offer a clear definition of homosexuality. Thus, the PHS has not contravened congres-
sional purpose by redefining that term. In fact, the organization's expertise peculiarly qualifies 
it to make such determinations. 
172. See Press Release, supra note 9, at 441. The INS guidelines also provided for the exclu-
sion of aliens who are identified by a fellow alien as a homosexual, id., but the likelihood of 
such an occurrence is remote, In re Hill, I. & N. Int. Dec. No. 2873, at 6 (July 9, 1982). 
173. Hill v. INS did not arise from standard procedures, but was essentially a test case. Les-
bian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. INS, 541 F. Supp. 569, 571 (1982), modified sub nom. 
Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983); see United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 
405, 406 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that defendant's failure to mention in his sworn visa application 
a conviction for soliciting other males was material to the issue of his admissibility since such 
an offense constituted a crime involving moral turpitude within the meaning of an exclusionary 
provision); Ganduxe y Marino v. Murff, 183 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 
278 F.2d 330 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960). 
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would make all homosexual aliens subject to deportation, 174 it seems 
unlikely that the INS would undertake such an operation. 11 s 
The conflicting circuit court views, however, are of consequence to 
the naturalization process. 176 One requirement of naturalization is the 
alien's lawful admission to the country. 111 Unlike deportation pro-
ceedings, which the INS initiates, the petitioner begins the naturaliza-
tion process 178 and bears the burden of proving eligibility for 
citizenship. 179 The INS could not overlook the alien's homosexuality 
in this process, and the alien's failure to disclose or denial of his or 
her homosexuality would constitute misrepresentation. 180 
Congressional action would provide the most definitive resolution 
of this controversy. A number of bills have been introduced which 
would settle this issue by eliminating section 212(a)(4) of the INA 
entirely. 181 None of these bills, however, have come close to passing. 
Nevertheless, such legislation still has support - the Justice 
Department, 182 the ~arter White House, 183 and at least one group of 
174. In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3861 (May 
29, 1984). The court seems to assume the continuing excludability of homosexuals and seeks 
only to determine what evidence will support such an exclusion. Consequently, the question of 
deportability would be a matter of introducing sufficient evidence that the alien had been a 
homosexual before entry. The nature of this evidence remains unclear, because medical diagnosis 
is disputed. If an admission of homosexuality provides a sufficient basis for exclusion, then little 
may be required to fulfill the government's burden of proof in deportation proceedings. 
175. The guidelines established for excluding homosexual aliens do not represent a rigorous 
policy of denying admission to all homosexual aliens. Since the Attorney General has discretion 
whether to deport and cannot be compelled to deport, United States ex rel. Masucci v. Follette, 
272 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the laxity in enforcing the exclusion provisions would prob-
ably be reflected in deportation as well. 
176. See Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981) (homosexuality found not to be incon-
sistent with naturalization requirement of good moral character); In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp 1208 
(D. Or. 1975); In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Contra In re Schmidt, 56 Misc. 
2d 456, 289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (alien's homosexual practices were inconsistent with 
good moral character). 
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1982). 
178. 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1982). 
179. 8 u.s.c. § 1429 (1982). 
180. Berenyi v. District Director, 385 U.S. 630, 637-38 (1967) (holding that alien's false denial 
of association with the Communist Party constituted evidence that alien lacked good moral 
character); Kovacs v. United States, 476 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1973) (evidence that alien had given 
false testimony concerning homosexual proclivities sustained denial of petition). 
181. S. 1086, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Sen. Cranston); H.R. 3524, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introduced by Reps. Dixon (Cal.), Beilenson, Waxman, Frank, Weiss, 
Barnes, Bingham, Burton (J.L. Cal.), Burton (P. Cal.), Chisholm, Conyers, Delloms, Fauntroy, 
Fazio, Garcia, Green, Lowry, McKinney, Mikulski, Mitchell (Md.), Ottinger, Richmond, Sabo, 
Stark and Studds); S. 2210, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (introduced by Sen. Cranston); H.R. 
6303, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (introduced by Reps. Beilenson, Dixon and Waxman); cf. 
H.R. 2815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (introduced by Rep. Dixon). 
182. "The Justice Department [suppo'rts) legislation which would eliminate homosexuality 
as a ground for exclusion." Press Release, supra note 9, at 442. 
183. See L.A. Daily J., White House Backs Letting Homosexual Aliens into U.S., June 27, 
1980, at 3, col. 6. 
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congressional representatives 184 have endorsed a policy of admitting 
homosexual aliens. 185 
CONCLUSION 
The fate of homosexual aliens wishing to enter, reside in, or become 
citizens of, the United States remains unsettled. The resolution of this 
conflict depends upon a determination of the PHS role in the exclu-
sionary process. The INA's legislative history provides ample evidence 
of Congress's consistent reliance on PHS expertise in formulating and 
amending the Act's medical exclusions. This reliance suggests that Con-
gress intended the PHS to revise the definitions of medical terms so 
they would conform with changing medical knowledge. Despite its moral 
overtones, homosexuality represents one such medical term for the pur-
poses of the INA. Thus, the PHS reevaluation of this term, in response 
to a change by the psychiatric profession, conforms with congressional 
intent. The INS, therefore, should not continue to ignore Congress's 
deference to the PHS's medical expertise. Instead, it should acknowledge 
the authority of the PHS by complying with the decision to discon-
. tinue the practice of excluding aliens on the basis of their homosexuality. 
-Robert Poznanski 
184. Memorandum of the Attorney General, supra note 9, at 576 n.4. 
185. If Congress fails to act, the Supreme Court, of course, has the authority to decide the 
issue pursuant to its jursidiction over circuit court conflicts involving a federal question. 28 U .S.C. 
§ IJ54 (1976); see Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); United States v. 
Zucca, 351 U.S. 91 (1956); United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956). 

